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A COMMENT ON HILL
VINOD KOTHARI*
Professor Claire Hill’s article on whole business securitization
provides a succinct account of the interesting device of whole business
securitization.  It is one of the very few investigations into the eco-
nomics of such devices and the exportability of the concept to
emerging markets.
Whole business securitization lies somewhere between the cate-
gories of asset-backed securities and corporate finance but is arguably
closer to the latter than to the former.  Whole business securitization
utilizes several features typical of asset-backed securities, including
the use of credit enhancements and the stratification of investors.
However, some of the key distinctive features of asset-backed finance
are: legal transfer and isolation of assets; independence of investor
service to the continued performance of the originator; off-balance
sheet funding, etc.  All these features are absent in whole business se-
curitization.  Furthermore, because whole business securitization en-
compasses all of the cash flows of an operating business, it is more of
a collateralization and bankruptcy-proofing device than it is an asset-
backed securitization.  However, since what matters to investors is the
ultimate credit quality of an investment, these hybrid finance transac-
tions have had an appeal and, if the trends in the past couple of years
are an indication, this appeal is increasing.
The legal basis for whole business securitization is the power of a
backup servicer, apprehending bankruptcy of the originator, to take
over the assets of the originator and have them administered for the
interest of the investors.  One source of this power is a provision of
U.K. insolvency law, which allows holders of floating charges on sub-
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stantially the entire property of a borrower to appoint an administra-
tive receiver, who effectively will be able to restrain the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court over such assets.1  Similar insolvency laws exist
in other countries such as Malaysia,2 Hong Kong,3 etc.  Even under
the Indian company law, debenture holders are entitled to exercise a
power conferred under the instrument of debentures and appoint a
receiver to take over the charged property.4  In the U.K., the pro-
posed Enterprise Bill was presented before Parliament on March 26,
2002.  This bill seeks to recast the insolvency regime and, in particu-
lar, scrap the administrative receivership.5  However, there are excep-
tions, inter alia, for capital market transactions.  From the way that
capital market transactions have been defined6 it seems that securiti-
zation transactions will continue to use administrative receiverships
even after the insolvency law reform.7  Administrative receivership is
not the only way used by whole business securitization to gain control
over the assets of the originator.  In various cases, pledge8 and un-
completed sale of assets9 have also been used.
1. The U.K. Insolvency Act of 1986 defines an administrative receiver as “a receiver or
manager of the whole (or substantially the whole) of a company’s property appointed by or on
behalf of the holders of any debentures of the company secured by a charge which, as created,
was a floating charge, or by such a charge and one or more other securities.”  Insolvency Act,
1986, c. 45, § 29(2) (Eng.).  The powers of an administrative receiver are laid out in Schedule 1
to the Act, which includes the power to take possession of the property secured by the charge.
Id. sch. 1.
2. See Rabindra Nathan, Insolvency Law Reforms: Report on Malaysia, ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK § C (Regional Assistance Project NO:5795-REG), at http://www.
insolvencyasia.com/insolvency_law_regimes/malaysia/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
3. See Charles D. Booth, Insolvency Law Reforms: Report on Hong Kong, China, ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK § C (Regional Assistance Project NO:5795-REG), at http://
www.insolvencyasia.com/insolvency_law_regimes/hongkong/index.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2002); see also Companies Ordinance §§ 300A, 300B (H.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov.
hk/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) (discussing provisions relating to the appointment of a
receiver in an insolvency proceeding).
4. Companies Act, 1956, § 424 (India).
5. See Enterprise Bill, 2002, cl. 241 (Proposed bill introduced in the House of Commons,
Mar. 26, 2002) (Eng.) [hereinafter Enterprise Bill], available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/115/2002115.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002) (proposing
Section 72A to amend the Insolvency Act by providing that a holder of a floating charge may
not appoint an administrative receiver).
6. Enterprise Bill, sch. 18 (proposing Schedule 2A to the Insolvency Act, providing the
exceptions to the prohibition on the appointment of an administrative receiver).
7. Id.
8. In the 2000 “Marne et Champagne” deal, a French equivalent of pledge was used to put
the champagne bottles under the physical custody of the trustees.  See Elena Folkerts-Landau,
Commentary: Principles for Analyzing Structured Finance/Corporate Hybrid Transactions,
STANDARD AND POOR’S, July 2, 2001, at http://www.standardandpoors.com/emarketing/
structuredfinance/copy070201hybrid.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2002) (describing Marne et
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Professor Hill’s article attempts to explain the inherent econom-
ics of whole business securitization, which, as she admits, is compli-
cated.  Off-balance sheet funding and the consequential regulatory
arbitrage is not applicable to these hybrid deals.  However, the author
finds explanation in primarily two distinctive features: bankruptcy
proofing,10 and the capital market window provided to an otherwise
bilateral transaction.11
The most important advantage of whole business securitizations
is the fixed and floating charge of the security trustee that acts as a
shield for investors.  This protection results from the pro-creditor
stance of U.K. insolvency laws, which is due to be scrapped for se-
cured borrowings in general, but is proposed to be retained for capital
market transactions, including securitization.  The other oft-cited ad-
vantage of whole business securitizations is that, in the event of bank-
ruptcy the originator, as the business operator, may be replaced by a
receiver who would take over the assets of the defaulting corporation
and manage the business to pay off the investors.  The rating agencies
expect that these features will “minimise the risk of bankruptcy, pre-
serve the value of the assets, organise external financial or operating
assistance in case of underperformance, and trigger a change of con-
trol in case of prolonged under-performance or insolvency.”12
While traditional asset-backed securitizations have passed sev-
eral tests of bankruptcy, the resilience of whole business securitiza-
tions in distress is yet to be tested.  Professor Hill’s analysis of the
economics of whole business deals will make eminent sense if the re-
cently completed deals utilizing whole business securitization con-
tinue to perform satisfactorily in difficult economic conditions.
Champagne, “which involved cash flows generated from the liquidation or turnover of
inventories,” as an example of a hybrid business operation that is very suitable for hybrid
securitization transaction).
9. In the “Rosy Blue” deal, a certain stock of diamonds was sold to the special purpose
vehicle (SPV), but not delivered.  Whenever the diamonds are actually sold to outsider buyers,
the SPV would make the sale and route the sale proceeds in accordance with the “waterfall.”
See generally Helene M. Heberlein & Polly Kolatas, Rosy Blue Carat S.A., FITCH STRUCTURED
FINANCE, July 10, 2001 (providing a pre-sale rating report).
10. “But what seems likelier as a source of benefit is the ex-ante intercreditor agreement
among the investors, with its careful planning for the firm’s bankruptcy.”  Claire Hill, Whole
Business Securitization in Emerging Markets, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521, 529 (2002).
11. “The other generic benefit is that securitization investors are capital markets investors,
providing cheaper sources of financing than banks.”  Id. at 528.
12. Benedict Pfister, Special Report: Whole Business Securitisations: A Unique Opportunity
for UK Assets, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Oct. 19, 2000, at 3.
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Another advantage, not discussed by the author, is that whole
business securitization allows a firm to leverage itself based on its fu-
ture revenues or assets that are not on-balance sheet, as opposed to
traditional financing approach, which only looks at assets on the bal-
ance sheet.  This results in both a higher leverage as well as funding
for a longer period.13
In her investigation of the applicability of the whole business
model to emerging markets, the author looks at the Malaysian wafer
plant’s $250 million funding raised in June 2001.14  However, there are
no examples of similar securitizations in Asia or, for that matter,
much securitization activity outside of Japan.  Ratings agencies and
law firms specializing in structured finance have been discussing the
increased interest of Asian corporations in using the device.15  The
author suggests that governments use credit or credit enhancements
to encourage the use of whole business transactions, as has been done
in Malaysia.  The experience with state guarantees has not widely
varied among Asian environments and, therefore, structural en-
hancements (i.e., subordination, credit derivatives, or such other fea-
tures which do not carry a political risk) are likely to be preferred by
investors.16
13. In private discussions, a JP Morgan London executive confirmed that a number of cor-
porate borrowers are tempted by the leveraging feature more than other factors.
14. Hill, supra note 10, at 526.
15. See Mark Adelson, Report from Arizona: Coverage of Selected Sessions of the February
2002 Securitization Conferences, NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, Feb. 27, 2002 (reporting
the deliberations at the ABS Summit organized by Frank Fabozzi/IMN Feb. 6–9, 2002, and sug-
gesting that the participants saw potential in operating revenues securitization, even in the U.S.
market).  “Notwithstanding the challenges and the pitfalls, operating asset securitizations are
the next frontier for structured finance.”  Id at 12.
16. There are examples where guarantees have not been honored by a state for purely po-
litical reasons.  For example, Enron entered into a power purchase agreement with a State Elec-
tricity Board in India guaranteed by the State Government of Maharashtra and counter-
guaranteed by the Union Government.  Francine R. Frankel, et al. eds., Politics of Infrastructure
Reforms: The Power Sector, 1 DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA 1, 10–11 (1998), available at
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/DBI-S98.PDF (last visited Apr. 11, 2002).  Both guaran-
tees were breached due to political motivations.
